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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j), 
as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment awarding two parcels 
of land to the Holdens under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de 
novo. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6 P.3d 1129. 
PRESERVATION IN RECORD BELOW: With respect to the south parcel of 
property, this issue was addressed by the Aults in their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 331). The west parcel of property was not 
raised until oral argument, at which time the Aults objected to its disposition. (R. 810 at 19-
20, 27-29). Further objection to inclusion of the west parcel was reiterated in response to 
the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 499 \ 6, R. 501). 
2. Did the judgment signed by the district court erroneously state that the 
Holdens were entitled to the disputed property because the Aults' deed failed to close, 
and because Aults' warranty deed was subject to the Holdens' alleged rights of 
possession? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de 
novo. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6 P.3d 1129. 
1 
PRESERVATION IN RECORD: This issue was addressed below by the Aults in 
their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
331). 
3. Did the district court err in concluding that no material issue of fact existed 
with respect to the Aults' claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and trespass? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's order granting summary judgment 
with respect to the Aults' other causes of actions is reviewed de novo by this Court. Jones 
v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6 P.3d 1129. 
PRESERVATION IN RECORD BELOW: This issue was addressed by the Aults 
in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R.331), and in objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 
501). 
4. Did the trial judge err in awarding attorney's fees against the Aults pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the Aults' Complaint was without merit is a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Pennington v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998). A finding of bad faith is a question of fact regarding 
subjective intent, which is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Id. Whether 
the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of fees are sufficient is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998). 
2 
PRESERVATION IN THE RECORD BELOW: Attorney fees were not 
mentioned by the Court or the Holdens until the submission of proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, to which the Aults objected. (R. 498 f 3). 
5. Did the trial judge err in awarding costs to the Holdens? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A challenge to an award of costs based upon 
timeliness or insufficiency of description is a question of law reviewed de novo. Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19, \ 11, 5 P.3d 616. 
PRESERVATION IN THE RECORD BELOW: The Aults filed a timely 
Objection to the Holdens' memorandum of costs. (R. 537). 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1). 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On November 30, 1998, the Aults filed a Complaint against the Holdens in the 
Third District Court in and for Tooele County, which complaint set forth four causes of 
action: Quiet title, conversion of personal property, unjust enrichment, and trespass. (R. 
7). The Holdens answered (R. 22), and on December 16, 1998, filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings (R. 26). After a hearing on September 27, 1999 (R. 809), the 
trial court denied the Holdens' motion (R. 208), and discovery was undertaken by the 
parties. 
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On February 8, 2000, the Holdens filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 279). 
Following oral argument, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision indicating that 
summary judgment would be granted. (R. 489; Addendum Exhibit 1). Counsel for the 
Holdens prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Summary 
Judgment, which Judge Young signed over the Aults' objections, denying the Ault's 
request for oral argument. (R. 515, 517; Addendum Exhibit 2). The final Summary 
Judgment was entered July 18, 2000. (R. 517). Although sanctions under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56 had not been raised in the Holdens' briefing, at oral argument, or in the 
court's Memorandum Decision, the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the final Summary Judgment contained an award of sanctions under the statute. (R. 517). 
The Aults filed a timely notice of appeal on August 7, 2000. (R. 526). 
A memorandum of costs and attorney fees was filed by the Holdens on August 1, 
2000. (R. 523; Addendum Exhibit 3). The Aults objected to the memorandum of costs as 
untimely, among other objections. (R. 537). Subsequently, a Motion for Order Fixing 
Amount of Attomey Fees was filed by Parker Nielsen, the Holdens' former attorney, who 
had withdrawn as counsel of record (R. 564). Over the Aults' objections and denying the 
Aults' request for oral argument, Judge Young granted the motion on October 19, 2000, 
awarding the Holdens $13,550.00 in attorney fees and $3,518.65 in costs. (R. 804, 807). 
The Aults filed a timely notice of appeal on November 3, 2000. (R. 812). The cases were 
consolidated by Order of this Court dated December 12, 2000. 
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Statement of Facts 
Background 
In 1962, Leo and Virginia Ault bought the historic John C. Sharp home and farm in 
Vernon, Utah.1 Over the years, the Aults have put considerable effort into restoring the 
home, which is a local tourist attraction and is on the National Registry of Historic Places. 
(R. 590-88).2 
The Aults purchased the property in December 1962 from Clarence M. Plant and 
Anna M. Plant Ross pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract, which was filed in the 
County Recorder's Office that same year. (R. 253, 307 f 5; Addendum Exhibit 4). The 
Contract contemplated a series of payments, upon completion of which a warranty deed 
would be delivered to the Aults. (R. 253 f 19). The warranty deed was executed by Plant 
and Ross on June 15, 1972, and was recorded by the Aults on August 22, 1974. (R. 256; 
Addendum Exhibit 5) 
In November 1969, the defendants Darrell and Patsy Holden began renting property 
immediately adjacent to the Aults on the south. (R. 699 lines 14-19, R. 139). On March 21, 
1973, the Holdens purchased the property they were renting from Joyce Sharp, Lorna 
Dalton, Dale Sharp, Charleen Sharp, Weston Sharp, Agnes Sharp, and Marcia Sharp 
John C. Sharp was the first postmaster in Vernon, and served as the first LDS bishop in 
Vernon from 1875 to 1900. History of Tooele County, Tooele County Daughters of Utah 
Pioneers, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1961, pp. 352-53, 356. 
Because the district court record is paginated from back to front, pages of documents in 
the file are indexed in reverse order. For ease of review, sequential pages are cited in 
descending page order, e.g., Yates deposition pages 17-19 are cited as R. 590-88. 
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Hepner. (R. 13; Addendum Exhibit 6). The Holdens' warranty deed was recorded on April 
9, 1973. Id. The deed specifies that the Holdens' north boundary is "the South line of the 
A. M. Ross and C. M. Plant property". (Id.; R. 243). It is undisputed that the Ross and 
Plant property is the Ault property. 
The strip 
The southern portion of the Ault property consists of an approximately 30-foot 
wide by 553 foot long strip of land previously used as a lane through which to run 
livestock from the county road on the east to the northwest part of the Ault farm. (R. 409-
10 nos. 6-7; Jensen Survey, Addendum Exhibit 7). The north side of the old cattle lane has 
been demarcated by a fence for many years. The fence begins at the county road and 
traverses west (yellow highlighting) to a point approximately 26 feet from the Aults' west 
border, where it turns northward (orange highlighting): 
A similar fence is present on the opposite (east) side of the county road, but that fence is 
located approximately 30 feet further south, running along the actual boundary line, which 
is the same as the Aults' boundary line. (See Jensen Survey, Addendum Exhibit 7). 
6 
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(Portion of Jensen Survey, attached in full as Addendum Exhibit 7). Physical evidence of 
the cattle lane, including portions of the gate, still exists. (R. 409-10 nos. 6-7). 
The portion of land between the fence line and the Aults' southern boundary line is 
referred to herein as "the strip". It is undisputed that the strip is within the land described in 
the Aults' warranty deed, and is not within the Holdens' deed. (R. 307 \ 7, 10; R. 107). 
Between 1963 and 1972, Leo Ault's father Owen Ault ran approximately 3,000 
sheep through the lane, and another individual named Collin Bennion ran approximately 50 
cattle. Additionally, Leo Ault had three horses on the strip at various times during those 
7 
years. (R. 409-10 nos. 6-7, R. 616 no. 5) The Aults also placed hay and stored irrigation 
pipe on the strip, and the Aults' children played on the property. Id. 
The western parcel 
As noted above, the fence turns and proceeds north approximately 26 feet west of 
the Aults' western boundary. The resulting rectangular-shaped piece between the west 
boundary line and the fence is referred to as the western parcel. 
On February 26, 1976, the Holdens purchased a thin, triangular piece of property on 
the west from Don Gowans. (R. 248 f 5). The property purchased from Gowans 
(highlighted in blue below) extended alongside the Holdens' land and the Aults' western 
parcel (highlighted in orange). 
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(Portion of Bullen Survey, attached in full as Addendum Exhibit 9). 
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Surveys 
Shortly before the Holdens began leasing the property to the south of the Aults in 
November 1969, a survey of the property to be leased by the Holdens ("the Rosenberg 
Survey") was commissioned by the lessors, members of the Sharp family. (R. 678). The 
Rosenberg Survey showed that the Aults' south boundary line lay approximately 30 feet 
south of the fence (yellow highlighting). The Rosenberg Survey also showed the Ault 
boundary on the west (orange): 
(Portion of Rosenberg Survey, attached in full as Addendum Exhibit 8). 
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Holden denies that he saw the Rosenberg Survey at the time it was completed in 
November 1969. Instead, Holden testified that the survey was given to his brother-in-law 
Burnell Thomas when Thomas and Holden purchased their adjoining tracts from the Sharps 
in 1973, and that he (Holden) did not personally see it. (R. 679-77, lines 23-12) Holden 
states that he became aware of, and saw a copy of, the Rosenberg Survey "probably in the 
'80s." (Id.; R. 675, lines 4-9). 
Another survey of the Holdens' property was completed on July 8, 1974, by H. K. 
Bullen in connection with Holden's 1976 purchase of the Gowans land on the west. (R. 
693-90). The Bullen Survey shows the fence running 32.5 feet from the Aults' south 
boundary line (yellow highlighting), then turning north and running parallel some 26 feet 
away from the west boundary line (orange). 
(Portion of Bullen Survey, attached in full as Addendum Exhibit 9). 
4
 As the parties did below, this Brief occasionally refers to the Holdens and the Aults in 
the singular, "Holden" and "Ault," for ease of reference and because most of the key 
events involved only Leo Ault and Darrell Holden. 
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The Bullen Survey stated that it was undertaken "for B. Thomas and D. Holden," 
and Holden admits that he knew about it at the time the survey was completed in 1974. (In 
fact, Holden's brother-in-law Burnell Thomas was present while the surveying was taking 
place.) (R. 675-74, lines 15-16). Nonetheless, Holden again claims not to have seen a copy 
of the survey until "probably in the late '80s." (R. 693, lines 9-16). 
In the late 1970s or early 1980s, a survey was performed for the Aults in connection 
with a lawsuit against a tenant, Wayne Dubois, for damage to the Ault house. (R. 378-77, 
395, 443 ff 22-23). The survey confirmed that the south boundary line of the Ault property 
lay 32 feet below the fence (yellow highlighting): 
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(Portion of Undated Survey, attached in full as Addendum Exhibit 10). 
In July of 1998, after conflict had developed between the parties, a survey by D.H. 
Jensen and Associates was conducted for Leo Ault. The Jensen Survey (reproduced 
above at page 7) again showed the Aults' south boundary approximately 30 feet south of 
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the fence, and the west boundary roughly 26 feet west of it. (Addendum Exhibit 7). The 
Holdens acknowledge that the Jensen Survey accurately depicts the Aults' south and west 
boundary lines. (R. 305-07 <H 4, 5, 7,12,19). 
The Jensen Survey indicated that the description of the property in the Aults' deed 
technically did not close along a portion of the northwest boundary next to the Gowans 
property. (Id.) All of the courses in the Aults' warranty deed are defined except the last, 
which reads, "thence south 1.77 chains to the place of beginning." (R. 306 f 15-16). On 
February 8, 1999, the Aults acquired quit claim deeds from Gowans to clear up any 
ambiguity in the description of their land. (R. 258-59). 
The Holdens' lease /management agreements 
From April 1, 1972, until 1977, Holden and Thomas jointly leased the Ault farm 
from the Aults. (R. 260, 688-83). The lease document cannot be located by either party, 
but correspondence accompanying Holden's initial lease payment to Ault in March of 
1972 was adduced below. (R. 260). 
From 1982 to 1997, Holden again leased the Ault farm, and had exclusive right to 
its use. (R. 19, 137, 683-88). Although Holden disagrees with the characterization of a 
"lease" during this period because the arrangements were oral, he testified that he had 
verbal agreements to "manage" the entire property each year in exchange for half of the 
crops raised. (R. 685-84, lines 20-25). Holden asserted in his Verified Answer that he 
managed the property "as an agent for Ault". (R. \9\ 1) 
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Prior discussions acknowledging the boundary lines 
At various times over the years, Holden and Ault had conversations in which both 
men acknowledged that the fence was not the boundary line. During one such discussion, 
according to Holden, Ault offered to deed the strip over to Holden as a neighborly gesture, 
but did not ever do so. (R. 668, lines 5-11). Holden testified that, during that conversation, 
he proposed trading another piece of ground to Ault for the strip. (R. 664, lines 17-24, R. 
653, lines 12-24). A couple of months later, however, Ault informed Holden that the 
proposed trade would not work because Ault had learned that the parcel being offered was 
not actually owned by Holden. (R. 653-52, lines 12-8). 
Holden testified that this conversation took place in approximately 1990, "plus or 
minus five or six years". (R. 668, lines 5-23, R. 666, lines 5-11, R. 664, lines 3-13, R. 660, 
lines 16-23). However, in an exchange between the two men that Holden tape recorded in 
1998, Holden stated that the earlier discussion had occurred "twenty years ago." (R. 667-65, 
lines 23-21, R. 656, lines 14-16). 
Based upon Holden's statement during the 1998 conversation, the trial court found 
that "the parties agree they had a conversation in 1978, that the fence was not the actual 
record boundary line as noted in their deeds." (R. 487). Holden also acknowledges that 
similar discussions might have occurred in both 1978 and 1990. (R. 664, lines 3-10). 
In 1997, Ault told Holden that he did not want him on the property any more because 
Holden had been putting up structures and fences that he did not want on his property. (R. 
651-50, lines 7-19). On June 2, 1998, Holden received a letter from Ault demanding that 
Holden remove his possessions from the Aults' property. (R. 638, lines 10-15). Holden 
13 
took umbrage with the request, and nailed a 'no trespassing' sign on the Auks' fence on 
July 3, 1998. (R. 635, lines 8-11). The Jensen Survey was subsequently completed, 
reaffirming the boundary lines. (R.104). In the "dead of night" (as the Holdens like to 
say) of November 25, 1998, Ault took down part of a fence on the west side of the Aults' 
property. (R. 511). 
Judge Young granted ownership of the southern strip to the Holdens under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Aults' acquiescence was established as a 
matter of law, the Court decided, because the Aults never sought to "oust" the Holdens 
from their property, and because of four other factors: 
At an unspecified time "in the 70s or 80s," the Vernon Irrigation Company 
installed an irrigation system on the Ault property that did not extend coverage to the 
property south of the fence. The system was installed without any input from Ault. (R. 
232-31, lines 17-14). In approximately 1984, Ault planted some pine trees on his 
property, and did not plant any on the strip. (R. 226-25, lines 24-4). At around the same 
time, Ault built a fence along the east side of his property, and ended that fence by 
hooking it onto the corner post of the south fence. (R. 228-26, lines 12-2). Finally, 
during the "mid-80s", the Holdens built a shed on the strip. (R. 487). 
Those factors, Judge Young decided, demonstrated as a matter of law that "the 
Aults and the Holdens mutually acquiesced in the boundary line through their actions." 
(Id.). Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Holdens, denying 
the Aults a trial on the merits. The court's Memorandum Decision did not address any of 
the parties' other arguments regarding title, and did not mention any factors pertaining to 
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the west parcel (R. 489-86). The court also did not address the Aults' other causes of 
action for conversion, unjust enrichment, or trespass. (Id.). 
Counsel for the Holdens subsequently submitted proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a proposed Summary Judgment that included favorable rulings 
on the Holdens' other theories relative to the Aults' quiet title claim, but did not address 
the Aults' Second, Third, or Fourth causes of action. Judge Young overruled all of the 
Aults' objections without comment, and denied the Aults' request for a hearing. (R. 509, 
516). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was inappropriate in this case for several reasons. 
With respect to the Aults' First Cause of Action (Quiet Title), the Holdens failed as 
a matter of law to establish two of the four prerequisites to the affirmative defense of 
boundary by acquiescence: (1) mutual acquiescence in the fence as a boundary, (2) for at 
least 20 years. 
One of the elements a defendant must prove in order to wrest property from a 
record title holder is that the parties (and/or their predecessors in interest) mutually 
acquiesced in a visible marker as a boundary line. No such showing could be made in 
this case, and indeed, the Holdens never attempted to prove anything other than that the 
Aults acquiesced in the existence of a fence. The only evidence in the record was that the 
fence was initially erected as part of a livestock lane, not as any sort of boundary. 
Moreover, the parties consistently acknowledged throughout the relevant time period that 
the fence was not the boundary line between their properties. The trial court found that a 
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conversation had taken place in 1978 in which both men acknowledged the location of the 
true boundary line, and the Holdens acknowledged that at least one other similar 
conversation took place in approximately 1990. The Holdens also had knowledge (or 
constructive knowledge) of various surveys undertaken during the period that clearly 
reflected the accurate boundaries. Parties who are aware of actual boundaries cannot 
locate a different boundary by acquiescence. 
The trial court's ruling that the Aults were required to "oust" the Holdens from the 
property ignores the fact that the Holdens were using the property with the express 
permission of the Aults. Indeed, for all but five years that the parties have been 
neighboring landowners, the Holdens leased or managed the Ault property. It would have 
been odd (and potentially actionable) if the Aults had sought to "oust" someone using the 
property pursuant to a lease or management agreement. 
The Holdens also failed to establish alleged acquiescence for the minimum 
required period of 20 years. The Holdens offered no evidence as to acquiescence by the 
parties' predecessors in interest, and therefore the relevant time period begins in 1973, 
when the Holdens purchased the adjoining property. For all but five years since that date, 
the Holdens occupied the Aults' property pursuant to lease or management agreements, 
which cannot count toward the 20-year minimum. Both parties acknowledged the true 
south boundary in 1978 and/or 1990 — less than 20 years after the Holdens became 
neighboring landowners — and, if the period begins to run in 1978, as the trial court held, 
the Holdens again cannot show 20 years, because the Aults ordered them off the property 
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in 1997. With respect to the west parcel, the Holdens adduced no evidence to show 
acquiescence for a 20-year period, and the same analysis would apply. 
The Holdens cannot circumvent their failure to establish the elements of boundary 
by acquiescence by alleging that the Ault deed does not close, or claiming that the Ault 
deed was subject to the Holdens' alleged rights in possession. Although the Jensen survey 
indicated that the Ault deed did not close in the northwest corner, the Aults cured any 
ambiguity through quit claim deeds from their neighbor on the west during the course of 
the litigation. In any event, the technical failure to close would not void the deed, 
because the language "to the place of beginning" was sufficient to convey the parties' 
intent and close the description, and because an alleged failure to close in one party's deed 
does not automatically entitle a neighboring party to ownership of disputed parcels. Both 
the Ault and Holden deeds accurately describe the boundaries, and the Holdens cannot 
rely on a technicality to claim ownership of property to which they otherwise have no 
claim. 
The Holdens also could not claim that the Ault deed was subject to their "rights in 
possession." The fact that the Aults' deed was recorded in 1974, one year after the 
Holdens' deed was recorded, provides no basis for awarding part of the Aults' property to 
the Holdens. There is no conflict between the two deeds, and the Holdens acknowledged 
in writing as early as 1972 that the neighboring property was owned by the Aults. Finally, 
the Holdens' argument disregards the fact that the Aults had recorded their Uniform Real 
Estate Contract more than 10 years before the Holdens recorded their warranty deed, 
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which was sufficient to place landowners on notice as to the ownership claims of the 
Aults. 
The trial court also erred in dismissing all of the Aults' other claims without regard 
to the existence of genuine issues of material fact. The Aults alleged causes of action for 
conversion and unjust enrichment, relating to unauthorized use of pipe and water shares, 
which were inherently fact-intensive claims. The Holdens' argument, implicitly accepted 
by the trial judge, that the Aults1 only cause of action for stolen pipe was a writ of 
replevin, lacked logical or legal support. Their other argument, that no one can be liable 
for unauthorized use of water because "water is owned by the sovereign," was 
nonsensical, because water rights can possess value in themselves. Finally, the trial 
court's dismissal of the Aults' trespass claim on the basis that the Holdens had permission 
to use the property is expressly contrary to its finding of boundary by acquiescence. 
Regardless of the ultimate disposition of the arguments in this appeal, the trial 
court erred in summarily imposing sanctions against the Aults under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56(a). That statute requires findings that the action was without merit, and that it 
was brought or asserted in bad faith. In this case, the Aults had no opportunity to address 
these elements, because the Holdens raised this issue for the first time by injecting it into 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which Judge Young signed without 
allowing oral argument. 
The findings signed by the trial court do not establish either of the two 
prerequisites to a statutory sanction. First, there was no finding — nor could there be — 
that the Aults' claims were "frivolous," but only that the Holdens were entitled to 
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judgment. Boundary by acquiescence is a highly complex and gray area of the law, and 
there is no other way to formally establish a boundary than by pursuing a quiet title 
action. 
There was also no evidence that the Aults brought their claims in bad faith, which 
requires a finding of subjective intent. The only finding made by the court was a vague 
reference to "the undisputed facts of record, including 'self help'" by Leo Ault in 
"destroying or attempting the destruction of the boundary fence." However, it is 
undisputed that Mr. Ault's actions relating to the west fence occurred prior to the filing of 
the complaint, which cannot support sanctions under §78-27-56. Moreover, taking down 
part of a fence in a non-confrontational manner is not in itself a sufficient basis to 
establish the element of bad faith under the statute. The trial court's award of sanctions 
was entirely inappropriate, and warrants reversal. 
Finally, the trial court erred in allowing costs, for two basic reasons: First, the 
memorandum of costs was filed five days beyond the period allowed under U.R.Civ.P. 
54(d). Second, the memorandum made no effort to establish the reasonableness or 
necessity of the costs. Under Utah case law, the memorandum of costs was insufficient, 
and the award of costs should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PARCELS 
TO THE HOLDENS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
As record title holders of the property at issue, the Aults are presumed to be the 
owners of their own land, and "to claim title to all the land called for by his deed unless it 
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clearly appears otherwise." Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202, 207 (1953). 
To counter this presumption in the court below, the Holdens asserted a claim of title 
"solely by virtue of long standing possession independent of record title . . ." (R. 107). 
Specifically, the Holdens relied upon the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Boundary by acquiescence is an affirmative defense upon which the Holdens had 
the burden of proving all elements. Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168-69 (Utah App. 
1993) ("A party claiming title by acquiescence must establish all of the required elements 
to give rise to a presumption of ownership in his or her favor"), citing Fuoco v. Williams, 
18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966). If the Holdens failed to establish any of these 
four elements, "then [they] have no case at all." Fuoco, 421 P.2d at 945. 
Because application of boundary by acquiescence deprives landowners of property 
for which they paid and possess record title, the doctrine is restrictively applied. Englert, 
848 P.2d at 169; Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 1990) ("boundary by 
acquiescence has always been restrictively applied in Utah"). To sustain the summary 
judgment in their favor, the Holdens were required to establish four elements as a matter 
of law by clear and convincing evidence: 
(1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, 
(2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, 
5
 Boundary by acquiescence requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. Leon v. 
Dansie, 639 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1981) ("proof positive"); City ofDeadwood v. Summit, 
Inc., 607 N.W.2d 22, 26 (S.D. 2000), citing Manz v. Bohara, 367 N.W.2d 743, 748 (N.D. 
1985), Dowley v. Morency, 111 A.2d 1061, 1067 (Me. 1999), Stone v. Rhodes, 107 N.M. 
96, 752 P.2d 1112, 1114 (App. 1988). 
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(3) for a long period of time (at least 20 years), 
(4) by adjoining landowners. 
Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1996).6 
The facts of this case showed that at least two of the elements could not be met, 
and that title should have been quieted in the Aults as a matter of law. 
A* Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
Throughout the lawsuit below, the Holdens took the position that mere 
acquiescence in a fence proves acquiescence in the fence as a boundary line. (E.g., R. 
180 ("fatally to the claims of Ault herein, all four surveys show the same fences, in the 
same locations, exactly, as they exist today"). The district court apparently made the 
same assumption, signing off on findings of fact that refer only to the existence of the 
fence. (R. 513 ff 10-12). 
The trial court's ruling disregarded the basic fact that a landowner's knowledge 
must be not only of a fence, but of the fence as a boundary. Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 
801, 805 (Utah App. 1994) (distinguishing prior case in which the "issue . . . was not 
knowledge of the fence's existence, but rather of its status as boundary"); Leon v. Dansie, 
For a six-year period, this Court imposed a fifth requirement, "objective uncertainty" 
about the location of the correct boundary. Halladay v. Guff, 685 P.2d 500, 504-05 (Utah 
1984). The fifth element was eliminated in Stoker. 
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639 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1981) (no "proof positive of any mutual acquiescence that the 
fence was or was intended to be a boundary"). 
Fences are erected for any number of reasons, including convenience, Florence v. 
Hiline Equipment Co., 581 P.2d 998, 999 (Utah 1978), and stock control, Grayson Roper 
Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 472 (Utah 1989), Madsen v. Clegg, 639 
P.2d 726, 727 (Utah 1981), Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 557 (Utah 1979), Anderson v. 
Osguthorpe, 29 Utah 2d 32, 504 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1972). In this case, there was no 
evidence as to the fence's origins, other than the Auks' testimony that the fence was once 
part of a livestock lane, and the fact that it is not aligned with the fence on the opposite 
side of the county road. See Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024, 1026 (Utah 
1991) (noting significance to finding of boundary determination that fence line was 
"aligned with other fences that run across the entire valley"). 
In Hancock v. Planned Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1990), this 
Court upheld a trial court's ruling that no boundary by acquiescence had been established. 
Crucial to the ruling, the Court wrote, was the fact that "there is no evidence whatsoever 
that the fence was erected to form a boundary or that there was mutual acquiescence as a 
boundary." Id.; see also Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990) ("Bonacci has 
not shown that there was mutual acquiescence in the fence line as the boundary between 
7
 The Aults recognized that a visible line (the fence) existed on the south, and that the 
Holdens occupied up to the fence after 1972, when the first lease was entered into. There 
was no evidence that the Holdens ever occupied up to the fence on the west. The Aults 
also acknowledged that the Holdens have been adjoining landowners since March 21, 
1973. 
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his property and the Colletts' property"). The Court rejected a claim of boundary by 
acquiescence on similar grounds in Florence, supra. "[T]here is nothing in the record to 
support the claim that these parties or any of their predecessors in interest have 
acquiesced in treating the fence as their mutual boundary," the Court wrote: 
A fence may be maintained between adjoining proprietors for the sake of 
convenience without the intention of fixing boundaries. Thus agreement to 
or acquiescence in the establishment of a fence, not as a line marking the 
boundary, but as a line for other purposes or acquiescence in the mere 
existence of the fence as a mere barrier, does not preclude the parties from 
claiming up to the true boundary line. 
581 P.2d at 999; see also Hancock, 791 P.2d at 187 (noting the "absence of any evidence 
regarding why the fence was built"). 
Compounding the lack of evidence as to acquiescence in the fence as a boundary 
was the trial Court's disregard of the parties' longstanding acknowledgement that the 
fence was not the boundary line. The court's ruling was contrary to the well-established 
rule that a boundary may not be located by acquiescence if both parties know of the 
boundary's true location. The Court of Appeals' analysis in Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC 
v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 1999), is precisely on point. In that case, Wilkinson 
and Babcock were adjoining landowners whose deeds properly reflected their common 
boundary. Babcock owned the property to the north of the boundary line; Wilkinson 
owned the property to the south, and a fence between the properties kept cattle off of 
Wilkinson's land. The fence followed the east-west boundary line precisely until it 
reached the east end. There, cliffs and gullies made following the true boundary 
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impracticable, so the fence veered northward, cutting off five acres from the southeast 
corner of the Babcock property. 
Wilkinson occupied the severed portion for more than twenty years, permitting his 
cattle to graze up to the fence line. Although both parties knew that the true boundary 
followed a straight line and not the "slant fence," neither Babcock nor her predecessors 
interrupted, or objected to, Wilkinson's use of the disputed property. After considering 
this evidence, the trial court nonetheless quieted title in Babcock, concluding that the 
element of mutual acquiescence had not been established. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that the element of mutual 
acquiescence requires "that both parties acknowledge the line as the demarcation between 
the properties," and that "acquiescence must be mutual and both parties must have 
knowledge of the existence of a line as [the] boundary line." Id. at 231 (citations 
omitted). Thus, the court continued, "if there is no uncertainty as to the location of the 
true boundary line, the parties may not, knowing where the true boundary line is, 
establish a boundary line by acquiescence at another place." Id. at 232 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Nunley v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962)). See also Wood v. Myrup, 681 
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1984) ("acquiescence cannot be inferred beyond 1959, when 
plaintiffs Critchley received a survey and knew that their legal line was some feet south of 
the fence"); Florence, 581 P.2d at 999 ("Where coterminous landowners know the 
location of the true boundary line, they may not establish a valid boundary line between 
their lands by a mere parol agreement at a place other than the true line"). 
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In Wilkinson, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument made by the Holdens 
below that considering the parties' acknowledgement of the actual boundary would 
"improperly reintroduce[] objective uncertainty as an element of boundary by 
acquiescence," writing: 
Wilkinson seems to argue that Staker not only eliminates objective 
uncertainty as any element, but renders knowledge of the true boundary 
irrelevant. This overstates Staker and fails to acknowledge the underlying 
nature of boundary by acquiescence. The "very foundation of the doctrine 
is that the law implies that the adjoining landowners were once uncertain . . 
. and that the boundary was marked on the ground in settlement thereof. . . 
." In contrast, "if there is no uncertainty as to the location of the true 
boundary line the parties may not, knowing where the true boundary line is, 
establish a boundary line by acquiescence at another place." 
993 P.2d at 232 (citations omitted). 
Despite the parties' acknowledgement of the true boundary in this case, Judge 
Young ruled that the Aults acquiesced from 1978 to 1998 as a matter of law because the 
Aults did not "seek to oust" and did "nothing to disturb" the Holdens from occupying and 
possessing the land, and "never took any action to physically occupy the disputed 
property and hence, to truly possess the property in question." (Memorandum Decision, 
R. 487). 
The difficulty with this conclusion is that a landowner has no reason to "oust" his 
neighbor if he has no reason to believe that the neighbor could ever assert a claim to the 
property. One of the primary purposes of boundary by acquiescence is to avoid litigation. 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 423 (doctrine based on "policy considerations of avoiding litigation 
and promoting stability in landownership"); Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d at 1080 (doctrine 
rests on "sound public policy of preventing strife and litigation"). Accordingly, case law 
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establishes that landowners have no duty to take action until after they have reason to 
know that claim is being made to ownership of their property. In Carter, supra, 885 P.2d 
at 806, the Court of Appeals observed: 
[According to [Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199, 
1200 (1973)], a landowner may acquiesce to a boundary through 
"indolence." And while 'indolence' has no agreed upon legal definition, it 
is generally defined as 'laziness or inactivity arising from a love of ease or 
aversion to work; indisposition to labor.' Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1154 (1986). Therefore, landowners may 
acquiesce to a boundary through idleness or laziness. In other words, a 
landowner whose property has been encroached upon acquiesces to the 
boundary when he or she 'either had or should have had knowledge that his 
[or her] property was being claimed by another.' 
885 P.2d at 806, quoting Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 788, 789 (1967) 
(emphasis added); see also Williams v. Oldroyd, 581 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1978) 
(acquiescence will be implied "if the party against whom the rule is applied has had 
knowledge that the adjoining owner claimed the line as a boundary") (emphasis added). 
Significantly, until shortly before the Aults filed the instant action in 1998, all 
parties consistently acknowledged that the strip was the Aults' property, and that the 
Holdens were occupying the strip with Aults' consent. Indeed, Holden's admission that 
he offered to purchase the strip (through a trade), and that Ault offered to deed it over to 
him, preclude any contention otherwise. See Van Dyke, 818 P.2d at 1026 ("There was 
also evidence that the Chappells attempted to purchase the property. This testimony alone 
. . . was sufficient to support the conclusion that the Chappells understood that the 
property in question belonged to Van Dyke . . ."); Williams, 581 P.2d at 563 (defendant's 
offer to purchase property demonstrated lack of acquiescence in line as boundary). 
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Judge Young, however, apparently agreed with the Holdens' argument that 
acquiescence can be found even if a neighbor's use of the property was with the 
o 
permission of the landowner. The error in that reasoning is that "mere acquiescence in 
use, without more, is insufficient to establish boundary by acquiescence. . . . 
Acquiescence in use is not equivalent to acquiescence in a boundary." Wilkinson, 993 
P.2d at 232 n. 3; see also Brown 232 P.2d at 207 ("The fact that a landowner allows 
others to share with him the use of his land does not 
necessarily signify a disclaimer of ownership."); Hales, 600 P.2d at 559 ("[S]haring the 
use of one's property is not the equivalent of a disclaimer of ownership; and failure to 
affirmatively claim to the true line [is] not acquiescence."); Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 
1224, 1227 (Utah 1974) (passively permitting land use is not sufficient to establish 
acquiescence). 
In Edgell v. Canning, 976 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999), this Court upheld a trial court's 
refusal to find boundary by acquiescence because the evidence suggested that the 
neighbor's use was with the landowner's permission: 
The trial court found that plaintiffs' use of the picnic area was 
permissive based on testimony that Mr. Bunnell, one of the owners of lot 
249 at that time, notified plaintiffs that he thought the picnic table appeared 
to be a few feet over the property line, but he said, 'it doesn't matter to me,' 
and he did not request its removal. Plaintiffs do not assert that they then or 
at any later time disputed Mr. Bunnell's assertion. . . . Thus there is 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that the use was not adverse but 
was permissive. 
(R. 810 at 23) Court: "[W]hat you're saying is boundary line by acquiescence has 
nothing to do with permission." Mr. [Parker] Nielsen: "That's right." 
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Id. 
Acquiescence is "[p]assive compliance or satisfaction . . . [cjonduct from which 
assent may be reasonably inferred. . . . equivalent to assent inferred from silence with 
knowledge or from encouragement, and presupposes knowledge and assent." Carter, 885 
P.2d at 801 (emphasis added)). If adjoining owners consistently acknowledge to each 
other that a fence is not the true boundary, one neighbor cannot suggest that assent to a 
claim otherwise can reasonably be inferred. 
The same analysis applies with even greater force when one considers that the 
Holdens were leasing / managing the Ault property. As noted above, for all but five years 
since 1972, the Holdens occupied the disputed property pursuant to lease or management 
agreements. Indeed, the Holdens have consistently taken the position in this lawsuit that 
they cannot be liable for trespass on the Aults' property because they had a right to be 
there. For instance, Darrell Holden testified in an affidavit: 
Affiant leased property owned, or allegedly owned by Leo H. Ault during 
various periods of time between 1972 and 1977. Affiant has managed 
property allegedly owned by Leo H. Au l t . . . at various times subsequent to 
1977, but had no lease thereto. Affiant did not trespass on the property 
allegedly owned by Ault, and could not do so because of said lease, 
acknowledged in the Complaint, and management agreements. 
(R. 137) (emphasis added). Similarly, Holden asserted in his Verified Answer that "it is 
not possible for Holden to have 'trespassed' on the property alleged in the complaint for 
the reason that the Complaint alleges, and Holden agrees that it is a fact that Holden was 
at material times lessee and manager of the property." (R. 16 \ 18). 
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As a matter of law (and logic), time spent occupying property under a lease or 
similar arrangement cannot count toward the minimum time requirement. Possession of a 
tenant is deemed that of the landlord. "It is an ancient and well settled rule of law that a 
tenant cannot, while occupying the premises, deny his landlord's title." Bender v. James, 
321 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Neb. 1982), quoting Carson v. Broady, 56 Neb. 648, 77 N.W. 80, 
81 (1898); Rockport Shrimp Cooperative v. N. F. Jackson, 776 S.W.2d 758, 760 
(Tex.App. 1989) ("As a general rule . . . a tenant is estopped to deny his landlord's title or 
to claim adversely to him"), Ziggy's Opportunities, Inc. v. 1-10 Industrial Park 
Developers, 730 P.2d 281, 285 (Ariz. App. 1986) ("The lease between I-10 and Brooks 
would have given Brooks permission to farm the disputed property for I-10, and thus I-10 
would not have had notice of an adverse claim through Brooks' use of the land north of 
the dirt road"; "[i]t is presumed that a tenant does not hold adversely to his landlord.") 
Lessor-lessee status between neighbors is analogous to common ownership, which 
prevents accrual of boundary by acquiescence. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 
(Utah 1998) (common ownership of adjoining properties restarts clock for determining 
boundary by acquiescence), citing Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Colo. 1996). 
The rationale for precluding boundary by acquiescence claims by lessees is 
obvious, and relates back to the basic notion that a landowner must be on notice that a 
claim is being made to ownership of his property. A landowner who is leasing his entire 
property to a neighbor, or who otherwise grants permission to use the property, cannot be 
presumed to be on notice that the neighbor's permissive use is secretly adverse. 
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B. For a long period of time (at least 20 years). 
The Holdens and Aults became neighboring landowners in 1973, when the 
Holdens purchased the adjoining property. The Holdens offered no evidence that their 
predecessors in interest acquiesced in the fence as a boundary, and in fact the only 
evidence in the record was to the contrary. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, however, the trial judge signed off on the following: 
The Ault deed is insufficient to establish title adverse to the interest of 
Defendants Holden, the boundary fence shown on the Jensen Survey having 
been in existence for more than twenty (20) years, and for more than sixty-
nine (69) years, and the uncontroverted facts establishing that the parties 
and their predecessors in interest have acquiesced in the boundary fence 
until the date of filing of this action. 
(R. 510,1 3 (emphasis added)). 
The only evidence submitted by the Holdens relating to this point was a sworn 
statement from Raymond Pehrson (who is not a predecessor in interest) that the fence has 
been in existence for at least 69 years. (R. 251). Pehrson later made clear that his 
statement was not intended to suggest that the fence was a boundary line, and that he has 
no idea where the boundary is. (R. 467). The mere fact that a fence existed is insufficient 
to show acquiescence by prior owners. See Fuoco, 421 P.2d at 946 ("there is no mention 
of Fuoco's predecessors in interest, and there is no direct evidence of their knowledge of 
the existence or their recognition and acquiescence in the ditch as a boundary line. In the 
9
 Dale Sharp and Marcia Sharp Hepner, two of the parties from whom the Holdens bought 
their property in 1973, testified by affidavit that the boundary lines were determined by 
the warranty deeds and surveys, that they "would never sell to a fence line," and that they 
never represented to the Holdens that the fence was a boundary line. (R. 461, 464). 
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instant case any inference of recognition and acquiescence in the ditch as the boundary by 
the various individuals, not record owners, who farmed the Fuoco tract is immaterial.") 
Simple math reveals that as a matter of law, the Holdens cannot meet the 20-year 
minimum. Absent any evidence of acquiescence in a claimed boundary by predecessors 
in interest, the relevant period can be measured only from when the Holdens became 
neighboring landowners (1973). The Holdens occupied the Ault property without express 
permission of lease / management agreements for only five years between 1973 and 1997, 
far short of the twenty required. Moreover, according to Holden, Ault asserted (and 
Holden acknowledged) the true boundary in 1978 and/or 1990, both of which are less 
than 20 years from 1973 in any event. Using Judge Young's start date of 1978, (based 
upon the 1998 conversation) the Holdens again fall short: Ault terminated the 
management agreement and ordered Holden off his property in 1997, which again 
terminates any claimed acquiescence short of 20 years. 
The same analysis (except that Holden was not an adjoining landowner until 1976) 
would apply equally to the west parcel, which was not addressed in the Holdens' motion 
for summary judgment. (See, e.g., R. 353, limiting discussion to "the 30 foot strip in 
controversy"). The Holdens adduced no evidence showing occupation of this piece at all, 
let alone acquiescence by the Aults for 20 years. With respect to both pieces of property, 
the Aults are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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II. THE HOLDENS CANNOT CLAIM TITLE TO THE 
DISPUTED PROPERTY MERELY BECAUSE THE AULTS' 
DEED ALLEGEDLY DOES NOT CLOSE, OR BECAUSE OF 
THE HOLDENS' ALLEGED "POSSESSORY" RIGHTS. 
A. The trial court erred in ruling that the Holdens were entitled to the disputed 
property because the Ault deed did not close. 
As noted above, the 1998 Jensen Survey indicated that one portion of the Auks' 
northwest boundary, approximately 100 feet in length, does not close. (Addendum 
Exhibit 7). From that, the Holdens argued below that they were entitled to ownership of 
the southern strip and the west parcel, even though both pieces are within the Aults' deed, 
neither is located in the area that failed to close, and neither is within the Holdens' deed. 
The district court did not address this argument in its Memorandum Decision, but the 
Holdens inserted favorable language in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
ultimately signed by the court. {See, e.g., R. 510 ffl 1-2). 
For the reasons discussed below, the Holdens' underlying premise is flawed, but 
the Court need not address the contention. The issue became moot on February 8, 1999, 
when the Aults acquired two quitclaim deeds from Gowans that would cure any alleged 
ambiguity in their original deed. Because the Ault description closed without question at 
that point, the Holdens could not seek to nullify the Ault deed for their own benefit. 
In any event, the Holdens' argument was erroneous. The Aults purchased their 
property through a Uniform Real Estate Contract in 1962, and acquired the warranty deed 
in 1972. Both documents contain a description of the property that concludes by stating 
the final course and distance, and then the words, "to the place of beginning." Under 
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Utah case law, this language was sufficient to close the description as a matter of law, 
even if the final course and distance did not actually return to the beginning point. 
"[I]n the construction of boundaries, . . . the intention of the parties is the 
controlling consideration." Losee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 P.2d 132, 137 (1951). In 
Losee, disputing parties claimed ownership to a piece of property described in both their 
respective deeds. Like the Holdens, the appellants claimed that the opposing deed was 
void by reason of an erroneous description that failed to close. Indeed, the final call of 
the deed description in Losee headed in a direction that would not have reached the point 
of beginning, despite the distance extended. Although this left a hole in the boundary 
description, the court declared that the description's final language, "then east 2.5 chains 
more or less to the place of beginning" expressed sufficient intent that both the course and 
the distance in the last call could be adjusted "to give effect to the clear intent that the 
tract close." Id. 
In Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976), the Court similarly 
applied a liberal rule of construction to find that a deed contained "a sufficiently definite 
description to identify the property it conveys." The Court noted that 
the rules which are generally applicable to controversies over the meaning 
of documents are also applicable to deeds. The problem lies in ascertaining 
the intent with which it was executed. It should be resolved, if possible, by 
looking to the terms of the instrument itself and any reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In this case, the Ault deed expresses a clear intent that the boundary return to the 
point of beginning and close. The description begins by heading east to the county road 
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that borders the Ault and Holden properties. From there, the boundary runs north along 
the center of the county road and then makes several turns, going far above and beyond 
the beginning point to the northwest. Finally, the description brings the boundary all the 
way back south and east toward the point of beginning. (Addendum Exhibit 5). As in 
Losee, the description in the Ault deed falls short of the beginning point, but the intent 
that the description close is nonetheless very clear. The final call of the description takes 
the boundary "thence South 1.77 chains (96.43') to the place of beginning, containing 
approximately 17 acres." {Id.) (Emphasis added). 
In the court below, the Holdens relied on Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 407, 367 
P.2d 193 (1962), and Drazich v. Lasson, 964 P.2d 324 (Utah App. 1998), for the 
proposition that the Aults' deed was void (and, therefore, that the Holdens should receive 
the Aults' property). In the former case, Mr. Howard had purported to convey some real 
property to his second wife, Mildred, prior to his death. Four other Howards—presumably 
Mr. Howard's children from his first marriage and the beneficiaries of his estate—sought 
to have the warranty deed declared a nullity. The court complied, finding that although 
"[t]he grantor's intention should be given effect if reasonably determinable," it was 
"impossible to determine what Howard had in mind." 367 P.2d at 195. 
In making its determination, the Court compared the Howard deed to that in Losee, 
discussed above. Regarding Losee, the Court observed, "There the courses were defined 
save the last. It was a few feet short, but was complemented by the phrase 'to the point of 
beginning.' There it was clear what the grantor intended." Id. at 194. Howard's deed, in 
contrast, revealed "little but confusion." The confusing facts included: Howard's deed 
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was hand drawn; it purported to convey about 2.75 acres, when in reality it conveyed 
almost five; from the point of beginning clockwise, the deed described essentially three 
sides of a square and then ended; Howard had described a tangential course that started 
from the same point but went counter-clockwise and made no sort of enclosure. See id. at 
194-95. Not surprisingly, the Court concluded that "[e]ither it is impossible to determine 
what Howard had in mind or, conjecture indulged, one would have to divine that any 
number of areas could be said to have been intended. In such a case, abstracters and 
lawyers should be able to turn down a title based on the contentions of such an asserted 
illusionary intention of a deceased." Id. at 195. The court thus nullified the deed, 
leaving the property in Mr. Howard's estate to be distributed accordingly. 
The deed in Drazich similarly could not be interpreted to convey any ascertainable 
tract. The property descriptions in the parties' deeds overlapped, with both parties 
claiming a common origin of title to the disputed parcel. Id. at 325. One of the two deeds 
purported to convey a corridor of land "two rods in width, lying sixteen and one-half feet 
on either side of the center line of an existing railroad track." Id. The deed, however, 
failed to describe the location of the tracks, which had been removed in 1904, and the 
only evidence presented at trial showed that "considerable confusion exist[ed] regarding 
the tracks' exact location." Id. Because the deed contained an imprecise description of 
the land to be conveyed, the court held it invalid and granted the opposing deed holder 
quiet title to the disputed property. Id. at 327. 
In Howard and Drazich, the courts invalidated the challenged deeds only because 
the grantor's intent regarding the property boundaries could not reasonably be inferred. 
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No confusing facts exist in this case. Rather, the Ault and Holden deeds are consistent in 
describing the disputed boundary; there is no overlap. Where two parties each have a 
legitimate claim to the same property, as in Howard (where one party was entitled by 
deed, the other most likely by will) and Drazich (where both parties were entitled by 
deed), public policy is furthered by invalidating an imprecise description in favor of one 
that is precise. But where, as in this case, there are no conflicting boundaries, the 
opposite is true. 
Moreover, the Holdens (and the trial court) overlooked the basic principle that an 
alleged defect in one party's deed does not automatically entitle someone else to the 
property. The failure to close at an unrelated point in the Aults' deed does not change the 
fact that the land is not contained within the Holdens' deed. When a party asserts 
ownership of property to which he has no claim by deed or inheritance, he must show the 
elements of boundary by acquiescence or adverse possession. Otherwise, grave inequities 
would be created, and every deed which does not close would be at risk to speculators.10 
B. The Ault Deed Is Not Subservient to the Holdens' Claimed "Rights in Possession". 
The Summary Judgment signed by Judge Young stated that "[t]he warranty deed to 
Aults alleged in the complaint is insufficient to convey title adverse to the interest of 
Holdens, it being subject to the rights of parties in possession and Holdens being in 
possession on August 22, 1975 [sic], when the Ault deed was recorded." (R. 516 \ 4). 
If one becomes entitled to a neighbor's property merely by showing that the neighbor's 
deed does not close, then the Aults are entitled to the Holdens' property, since the 
Holdens' deed also does not close. {See Jensen Survey, Addendum Exhibit 7). 
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This ruling reflects an argument advanced by the Holdens based upon certain language in 
the Ault deed. Among other provisions, the Ault deed states that it is: 
SUBJECT TO general real property taxes since the year 1962, to all 
charges or assessments for ditch improvements and subject to the rights of 
parties in possession and to all existing easements and rights of way. 
(R. 256). 
The Holdens contend that they were "parties in possession" when the Ault 
warranty deed was recorded, and therefore the deed must yield to their claim. The 
Holdens also allege that because the Aults' deed was recorded (1974) after the Holdens' 
deed (1973), "under Utah's 'race to the registry' system . . . the Holden deed prevails as 
to any conflict between the two." (R. 433). 
The problem with this contention — and the trial court's acceptance of it — is 
threefold. First, there is no conflict between the two deeds. The Holdens' deed specifies 
the north boundary of their property as the "South line of the A.M. Ross and CM. Plant 
property." The Ross/Plant property is the Aults' property. The deeds do not overlap. 
The second defect in the Holdens' argument is that they were "in possession" of 
the disputed property in 1972, 1973, and 1974 pursuant to a lease from the Aults. It is not 
reasonable to suggest that a warranty deed between Plant/Moss and the Aults purported to 
convey an ownership interest in the Aults' lessee. 
Finally, the Holdens' argument ignores the fact that the Aults recorded their 
Uniform Real Estate Contract more than ten years before the Holdens recorded their 
warranty deed. The Aults' Contract contained the same property description as their 
subsequent deed. Pursuant to the Contract's terms, the Aults made a down payment on 
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the property and then paid yearly installments, at the conclusion of which they received 
the deed. In most seller-financed transfers of property, purchasers do not initially receive 
the actual deed; the seller retains it until payments are complete. The Aults properly filed 
the Contract, which was sufficient to protect them against subsequent purchasers and to 
put purchasers on notice of the Aults' interest. (Indeed, the Holdens were well aware that 
the Aults owned the property, as evidenced by their attorney's March 1972 
correspondence tendering the Holdens' lease payment to Ault. (R. 260)). Affording no 
legal effect to the timely filing of a Uniform Real Estate Contract, or to actual notice of 
ownership interest, is unwarranted under Utah law and the circumstances of this case. 
III. FACT ISSUES EXISTED WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFFS' 
OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION. 
The final order signed by Judge Young dismisses the Aults' action in its entirety, 
without any mention of the Aults' causes of action for conversion, unjust enrichment, and 
trespass. Although the Aults objected to a final judgment on that basis, Judge Young 
summarily overruled the objections denying the Aults' request for oral argument. For the 
reasons set forth below, it was inappropriate for the trial court to enter judgment on the 
Aults' other claims because genuine issues of material fact existed. 
A. Conversion. 
The Aults' Second Cause of Action, titled Conversion, alleged: 
During the time Mr. Holden leased the property, Mr. Ault purchased lengths 
of pipe, elbows and plugs, to use on his property, at a cost of approximately 
$7,000.00. In the course of leasing the Ault Property, Mr. Holden converted 
some of the pipes, elbows and plugs for his own purposes, causing damage to 
the Aults of several thousand dollars. After Mr. Holden used the pipe for his 
own purposes, he failed to return numerous lengths of pipe. 
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* * * 
While leasing the premises, Mr. Holden used the pipe for his own purposes 
and failed to return approximately 28 lengths of pipe. 
(R.5-6TI H-13, 21). 
Although Holden denied the allegations, he essentially admitted that a dispute 
existed as to ownership of the pipe, indicating in his Verified Answer that "any and all pipes 
used and/or claimed by Holden are stored on Holden's property and could be produced if 
ordered replevied by this Court." (R. 17 f 15). Whether a defendant stole a plaintiffs 
property is hardly the type of claim that can properly be resolved through summary 
judgment. The Holdens claimed that judgment was warranted, however, arguing that 
"Holden has denied the claim, but more importantly, conversion is not stated as to pipes 
which have not been removed and remain within a matter of feet from Ault's premises. The 
appropriate action, if there be one, is replevin." (R. 288). 
The Holdens offered no citation for the proposition that claimants must forego 
conversion claims in favor of replevin if stolen property happens to be retrievable, and 
dismissal of this claim was patently erroneous. A claim for conversion lies if the defendant 
commits "'an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by 
which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession.'" Lake Philgas 
Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App. 1993), citing Phillips v. 
Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991). The Aults claimed that the 
Holdens interfered with (stole) their chattel (pipe) and deprived them of its use and 
possession; the Holdens denied it-not a promising basis for summary judgment. 
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The Aults' conversion claim also included an allegation that the Holdens 
unlawfully "used water belonging to Mr. Ault for his own purposes," noting that the Aults 
"have paid all property taxes and water shares since purchasing the Ault Property." (R. 5-
4 ff 8, 14, 22). In response, the Holdens took the rather novel position that no one can be 
guilty of converting water, "for water is owned by the sovereign." (R. 288). The Holdens 
stated below that "this Court needs no citation, we are sure, for the proposition that water is 
subject to use under a certificate of appropriation issued by the State Engineer," id., which 
assessment ultimately proved correct, as Judge Young apparently found the unsupported 
argument sufficiently persuasive to warrant dismissal of the Aults' conversion claim. 
The Holdens' argument wholly ignored the well-understood concept of water rights, 
which are purchased and have value in themselves, and was contradicted by Mr. Holden's 
own admission that one is not allowed to use someone else's water shares without 
permission. (See, e.g., R. 644-43, lines 11-12 (Holden obtained signed authorizations 
before using others' water)). Holden further claimed that lease payments he made to Ault 
included "a certain amount of money for the use of his land and water" and that the 
subsequent "management agreement" included permission to use Ault's "personal property 
and his water." (R. 682, lines 1-4; R. 688-87, lines 22-3; emphasis added). 
Unauthorized appropriation of a valuable property — in this case, water shares — 
supports a claim of conversion, and summary judgment on the Aults' Second Cause of 
Action was inappropriate. 
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B. Unjust Enrichment. 
In their Third Cause of Action, the Aults alleged that "[wjhile leasing the 
premises, Mr. Holden used the Aults' pipe for his own purposes and failed to return it, 
thus being unjustly enriched," and that "Mr. Holden was further unjustly enriched as a 
result of using the Aults' water for his own purposes, without permission." (R. 4 fj[25-
26). 
To recover on a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he 
conferred a benefit on the defendant, (2) the defendant had an appreciation or knowledge 
of the benefit; and (3) under the circumstances it would be inequitable for the defendant 
to retain the benefit without payment of the benefit's value. Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B &L 
Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, \ 13, 407 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
The Aults claimed that a benefit was received by the Holdens (irrigation pipe and 
the use of water), that the Holdens knew it, and that it would be inequitable for them to 
retain the benefit without paying for it: a viable unjust enrichment claim. The Holdens' 
response consisted of a single sentence: "Water is not paid for, so its use would not be 
unjust enrichment, nor would use of pipes be an unjust enrichment, in the absence of their 
sale or conversion otherwise to cash." (R. 288; original emphasis). 
With respect to the baseless claim that use of someone else's water rights is not a 
benefit, the Aults refer the Court to the preceding section. As for the pipe, the Aults 
submit that use of someone else's property inherently involves the receipt of a benefit. 
The Holdens used the Aults' pipe instead of purchasing their own. They received a 
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benefit, and it would be inequitable for them not to compensate the Aults. The summary 
judgment should be reversed. 
C. Trespass. 
The Aults' Fourth Cause of Action alleged that the Holdens had committed trespass: 
"At various times during the time the Aults have owned the property in question, the 
Holdens have unlawfully trespassed on said property by, among other things, building 
structures on the Ault property without permission, and illegally entering said property." 
(R.4I29). 
The Holdens' resistance to this claim was that "Holden agrees that he was lessee 
during part of the period alleged and manager of the Ault property during other periods. 
Holden could not, therefore, be a 'trespasser,' and the Court can so conclude as a matter 
of law." (R. 288). Judge Young accepted the Holdens' invitation, dismissing the Aults' 
complaint in its entirety, but such a ruling is inherently inconsistent with his finding of 
boundary by acquiescence, as discussed in Point I above. 
IV- THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS 
AGAINST THE AULTS, BECAUSE THEIR CLAIMS WERE 
BOTH MERITORIOUS AND BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH. 
Section 78-27-56(a) of the Utah Code provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court 
shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith. . . ." Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56(1). To succeed on a claim for attorney's fees, a 
party must show both (1) lack of merit and (2) bad faith. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 
151 (Utah 1983). 
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In this case, the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Young made no mention 
of sanctions or bad faith, and no such suggestion was made in any of the briefing or at 
oral argument. Nonetheless, the Holdens' counsel inserted the following language into 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which Judge Young signed: 
The action filed by Plaintiffs Ault was without merit, and not brought or 
asserted in good faith, within the meaning and intent of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-27-56(1), including because of the foregoing uncontroverted facts 
indicating that Auks' claim to title is defective and/or subject to the 
interest of Defendants Holden; and because of the undisputed facts of 
record, including 'self help' by Plaintiff Leo Ault subsequent to filing of 
the Complaint herein by destroying or attempting the destruction of the 
boundary fence. 
This ruling should be reversed because the Aults' claims were both meritorious 
and brought in good faith, and the findings were insufficient on their face to support an 
award of fees. 
A. The Aults' claims did not lack merit. 
For an action to be without merit, it must be "frivolous," meaning "of little weight 
or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. Under the 
comparable Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if a claim is even just 
"plausible" under existing law, it cannot be deemed frivolous. See Barnard v. Utah State 
Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993). This Court has warned that the statute is purposefully 
drawn narrowly: "It was not meant to be applied to all prevailing parties in all civil 
suits." Cady, supra; see also Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 
(Utah 1991) ("A party may bring a good faith action and not prevail. Failure of a cause of 
action or defense does not automatically require the losing party to pay costs. If we were 
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to adopt such an approach, parties who had difficult but valid claims would be 
economically precluded from bringing suit"). 
The language inserted by Holdens' counsel in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law appears to presume that losing a motion for summary judgment is 
sufficient to deem a complaint frivolous. The only finding relative to merit is a reference 
to "the foregoing uncontroverted facts indicating that Aults' claim to title is defective 
and/or subject to the interest of Defendants Holden," which is nothing more than a 
reiteration of the conclusion that the Holdens were entitled to judgment. Ironically, Judge 
Young's Memorandum Decision did not even address either of those two arguments 
(defective title or possessory interest), yet those were the sole bases offered to meet the 
"lack of merit" requirement. 
The Aults believe that their claims are meritorious as a matter of law. However, 
even if this Court ultimately disagrees with the Aults' position, that disagreement in itself 
should not be deemed sufficient to sustain an award of fees. Boundary by acquiescence is 
a complex area of law that long has been prone to doctrinal changes and close calls. Even 
this Court has wrestled with the "highly technical, historically debated, somewhat arcane 
rule of property law," Staker, 785 P.2d at 424, and recognized that the doctrine "has been 
the source of considerable confusion and controversy among judges, 
lawyers, and landowners in this state." Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500, 503 (Utah 
1984).11 
For example, this Court added a fifth element to boundary by acquiescence in 
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Moreover, as the Court of Appeals has suggested, a statutory fee award may be 
less appropriate in a quiet title suit, because such an action is the only way in which a 
boundary dispute can be resolved. In Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah App. 
1997), the plaintiffs sought attorney fees because they were required to file a quiet title 
action before the defendant agreed to sign a quitclaim deed. The Court of Appeals 
rejected the contention, observing that fees would be inappropriate in light of the special 
nature of boundary-by-acquiescence claims: 
We acknowledge that Utah courts recognize the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. However, although these cases may be persuasive, they 
neither establish nor guarantee that the Chipmans had a clearly defined right 
to the property in this instance. Merely meeting the judicially created 
requirements of boundary by acquiescence does not create legal ownership. 
Absent a voluntary agreement between the disputing parties, a quiet title 
action is the only legally binding way to settle a boundary dispute. 
Therefore, we cannot say that Miller acted in bad faith in refusing to sign 
the quitclaim deed until after the Chipmans had filed suit. 
Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). 
B. The Aults9 claims were not asserted in bad faith. 
There was no evidence from which Judge Young could have concluded that the 
Aults brought their action in bad faith. In order to satisfy this second element of Section 
78-27-56, the court was required to find at least one of the following factors: "(i) The 
party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party 
Halladay, then reversed itself six years later in Stoker. One year later, the Court reversed 
itself again from prospective application of Staker to retroactive. See Judd Family Ltd. 
Partnership v. Hutchings, 797 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1990), modified by Van Dyke v. Chappell 
818 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1991) ("we did not examine carefully the basis for that 
decision"). 
45 
intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted 
with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others." 
Childs v. Callahan, 993 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1999), citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
The concept of bad faith "turns on subjective intent," Chipman, 934 P.2d at 1161, 
which renders its application on summary judgment especially suspect because the judge 
has had no opportunity to hear the parties' testimony or to observe their demeanor, and is 
not supposed to be weighing evidence or choosing between conflicting versions of events. 
In Cady, even where plaintiffs "clearly were pursuing a meritless claim" and had 
disregarded the trial court's direction to research their claim, this Court refused to find 
bad faith: 
In the instant case, the trial court found lack of good faith because had 
plaintiffs researched the issue as instructed at pre-trial conference, they 
would have discovered they had no valid claim and they could have saved 
the court valuable time by avoiding trial. We disagree that this conduct 
constitutes bad faith. Plaintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and 
better preparation might well have disclosed that to them. However, that 
conduct does not rise to lack of good faith. The evidence must also 
affirmatively establish a lack of at least one of the three elements of good 
faith heretofore discussed. There was no evidence that plaintiffs lacked an 
honest (although ill-formed) belief in their claim; that they had an intent to 
take an unconscionable advantage of defendants; nor that they had the 
intent to, or knowledge that their suit would hinder, delay or defraud 
defendants. 
671P.2datl51. 
A finding of bad faith "must be supported by sufficient evidence that one or more 
of these factors existed." Chipman, 934 P.2d at 1163. In this case, the only finding 
relative to bad faith was a vague reference to "the undisputed facts of record, including 
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'self help' by Plaintiff Leo Ault subsequent to filing of the Complaint herein by 
destroying or attempting the destruction of the boundary fence." 
Reliance on this "finding" to support an award of fees poses three basic problems. 
First, Ault did not take down the fence after the Complaint was filed. Ault took down the 
fence on November 25, 1998 (R. 511 f 33). The Complaint in this case was not filed 
until November 30, 1998. (R. 7). Under the language of the statute, attorney fees may 
not be awarded for conduct that precedes a civil lawsuit, or is not part of the litigation 
process. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (fees awardable only if "the action or defense to the 
action . . . was not brought or asserted in good faith . . . . " ) . 
The finding also suffers from the fact that, by its own terms, it pertains to removal 
of a fence on the west portion of their property, not "the boundary fence," which has been 
used throughout the litigation to mean the south fence. Inasmuch as the west parcel was 
not addressed in the Holdens' motion for summary judgment, and Judge Young did not 
mention it in his Memorandum Decision, unhappiness with removal of a fence in that 
area should not be sufficient to support an award of fees. 
Finally, the Holdens' oft-repeated allusion to Ault removing the fence "in the dead 
of night" adds nothing to the Section 78-27-56 analysis. Taking down of contested fences 
is a common, and not particularly controversial, event in boundary-by-acquiescence cases 
- particularly if removal is by the record title holder. See, e.g., Hales, 600 P.2d at 557, 
Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1984), Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 
530 P.2d 792, 793 (Utah 1975). Doing so at a time when a confrontation is less likely to 
occur is logical. There simply was no showing that the Aults lacked an honest belief or 
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desired to take advantage of, hinder, delay, or defraud the Holdens, and the award of 
statutory fees should be overturned. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COSTS. 
A. The memorandum was untimely. 
Under Rule 54(d), a memorandum of costs must be filed within five days of an 
entry of judgment: 
The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry 
of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum 
thereof duly verified . . . 
U.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2. 
"This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the Court[.]" Lyon v. Burton, 
2000 UT 19,1 77, 5 P.3d 616. In Lyon, judgment was entered on July 11, 1995, and the 
claimants did not file their verified memorandum of costs until July 26. This Court 
upheld the district court's denial of costs, noting: 
As we stated in Walker Bank Trust Co. v. New York Terminal Warehouse 
Co., [10 Utah 2d 210, 216, 350 P.2d 626, 630-31 (I960)], failure to satisfy 
the requirement for filing a verified memorandum of costs is fatal to a claim 
to recover costs under Rule 54. Here, as in Walker Bank, the Lyons' failure 
to file the verified memorandum of costs within five days of the judgment 
prevents the award of costs. 
12 The Aults acknowledge that the language of the statute technically does not require a 
separate motion or hearing on whether attorney fees should be assessed. An award of 
fees is an extreme measure, however, and has a significant impact on litigants. The Aults 
submit that merely signing off on language inserted for the first time in proposed findings 
of fact, without any indication of independent review and without allowing the Aults oral 
argument, was an abrogation of the lower court's judicial responsibilities. 
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Judgment was entered in this case on July 18, 2000. (R. 517). The Holdens' 
memorandum of costs was not filed until August 1, 2000. (R. 523). Excluding the date 
of entry, weekends and the intervening holiday (U.R.Civ.P. 6(a)), the memorandum of 
costs was due no later than July 26, 2000. The memorandum was untimely, and the trial 
court erred in awarding costs. 
B. The memorandum did not establish reasonableness or necessity. 
Under Utah law, to recover costs, a claimant must specify costs and establish their 
reasonableness and necessity. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980); Lloyd's 
Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ldt., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988). The 
Holdens made no such effort in this case. Their memorandum contained nothing more 
than a general assertion of $3,518.65 in costs ($2,550.00 for "Depositions, transcripts of," 
and $968.65 for unspecified "other costs"). (R. 522). Under Frampton and Lloyd's, the 
memorandum was insufficient on its face, and costs should not have been awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellants Leo and Virginia Ault respectfully 
request that the order granting summary judgment be reversed and that the case be 
remanded. Appellants request that the trial court be directed to enter judgment for the 
Aults on their First Cause of Action (Quiet Title), and to allow the Aults to proceed to 
trial on their other causes of action. 
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